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INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Utah changed its auto insurance law to protect insureds by making
the presumptive limits for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage the same as the
policyholder's liability limits. The legislature required auto insurers to give their
policyholders enough information that the policyholder could make an informed
choice to increase his or her UIM limits to match the policy's liability limits. 1 For
new policies, the auto insurer had to get a written acknowledgment from the
insured that it was waiving the higher coverage. 2 For existing policies, the auto
insurer had to provide the insured with certain information "with the first two
renewal notices sent after January 1, 2001." 3 In this case, Allstate did neither.
Yet, when the Casadays, Allstate's insureds, were involved in an accident with an
underinsured motorist, Allstate told the Casadays that they only had $10,000 per
person in UIM coverage, not $100,000 per person, the amount of their liability
coverage. The Casadays brought this action against Allstate claiming that its
refusal to provide more than the statutory minimum in UIM coverage was a
breach of contract and bad faith.

See generally General Sec. Indent. Co. of Ariz. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App
109,11 9 & n.4,11-15, & 23,158 P.3d 1121, cert denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007).
2

3

U T A H CODE A N N .

§ 31 A-22-305(9)(b) (2001).

Id. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) (2001).
1

Allstate relied on a narrow reading of the plaintiffs' complaint to argue
that the plaintiffs were only claiming that their policy was a new policy, and,
since their policy was in fact a renewal policy, the plaintiffs' claims against
Allstate failed as a matter of law. The trial court agreed and granted Allstate's
motion for summary judgment.
Before bringing this action, the Casadays asked Allstate for proof that it
had complied with the 2000 amendment to the UIM statute. Allstate does not
dispute that it did not give the Casadays the information they requested, nor
does it dispute that it knew the proper subsection of the UIM statute that the
plaintiffs' claims arose under (subsection (g)) even before the Casadays filed suit,
that it identified the proper subsection in its answer, and that it went through
extensive discovery on whether it had complied with the requirements of
subsection (g), all without objection. Because the "pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,"
did not show that Allstate was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the trial
court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment. 4 And the trial
court compounded its error when it denied the Casadays' post-judgment motion
to alter or amend the judgment, to amend the pleadings to conform to the
evidence, or to allow the Casadays to file an amended complaint.

4

See U T A H R. CIV. P. 56(c).
2

ARGUMENT
L
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ALLSTATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
As Allstate acknowledges, 5 in deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the trial court must look beyond the pleadings: Summary judgment"shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law/ / 6 Allstate focuses only on the Casadays' complaint and ignores the rest of
the record.
Allstate claims that each of the Casadays' claims against it was based
"solely" on two assertions: (1) that Allstate violated section 31 A-22~305(9)(b) of
the Utah Code, and (2) that Allstate violated "Utah law." It claims that
subsection (b) did not apply in this case because it only applied to new policies,
and the Casadays 7 policy was not a new policy. It also claims that the allegation
that Allstate violated "Utah law" was insufficient to give it fair notice of the
Casadays 7 claims.

See Br. of Appellee at 10.
UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).
3

Allegations in a complaint should be construed liberally.7 In fact, each of
the Casadays' claims was based on their averments that, under Utah law, Allstate
should have provided them with UIM limits equal to their liability limits
($100,000 per person). (See R. 3, f 10 ("Plaintiffs should have been entitled to the
protection of their underinsured motorist coverage issued by defendant in a
minimum amount of $100,000 per person, up to $300,000 per occurrence."); R. 4,
Tf 12 ("In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, defendant advised
Plaintiffs that their policy of insurance only provided underinsured motorist
coverage in the amount of $10,000"); R. 4, % 14 (Allstate "falsely represented] to
[plaintiffs] that the limits of their underinsured motorist coverage with defendant
was $10,000 per person"); R. 5, f 15 ("The defendant has refused to pay the limits
of underinsured motorist coverage required by the policy and by law.").
Whether that was because the Casadays' policy was a new policy, as alleged in
paragraph 4 of the complaint (R. 2, f 4), and therefore subject to subsection (b) of
the UIM statute, or an existing policy and therefore subject to subsection (g) of
the UIM statute, as Allstate alleged in its answer (R. 25, f 6), the Casadays' claim
was that Allstate falsely told them that their policy only provided UIM limits of
$10,000, "[i]n violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts" (R. 4, ^ 12; see also
R. 649:14-655:14; 663:1-665:20), that Allstate had not complied with the provisions

7

DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
4

of the UIM statute, and that the Casadays' UIM limits should therefore have been
equal to their liability limits.
This conclusion is borne out by the other "pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file/' which Allstate simply ignores. As
noted, Allstate specifically alleged in its answer that "Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9)(g) (2001) specifically applies in lieu of subsection 9(b)" and that "Allstate
fully complied with the provisions of subsection 9(g)." (R. 25, f 6.)
In response to Allstate's request that they admit that "there is a reasonable
basis for Allstate's contention that Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-3-5(9)(g)(2001)
governs" their claims, the Casadays admitted that
not only does Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22~305(9)(g)(2001) govern the
amount of the plaintiffs7 policy limits, but that § 31A-22305(9)(b)(2001) may also apply, since, whenever plaintiffs added or
deleted a vehicle from their policy of insurance, the policy may be
considered a "new polic[y]."[8]
(R. 464 (citations omitted).)

8

The distinction between new and existing policies is not always
clear. Other courts have held that where an insured makes changes to an existing
policy, such as by adding a new car to the policy or another insured, the policy
may be considered a new policy for purposes of similar statutes. See, e.g., Savant
v. American Central Ins. Co., 725 So.2d 43,47 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("Ordinarily,
when there are changes in the insurance policy which involve the addition of
insureds or vehicles, the policy is a new policy which requires the execution of
new UM forms.") (citations omitted), writ denied, 739 So.2d 202 (La. 1999).
5

The parties engaged in extensive discovery, including depositions of key
Allstate emplo)/ees. Virtually all of this deposition testimony was directed at
whether Allstate had complied with subsection (g), and Allstate did not object to
the testimony as irrelevant or beyond the scope of the Casadays' claims. {See, e.g.,
R. 86-89, \ \ 7-17; 99; 102-05; 108-09; 111; 119-22; 127; 185-86, \ \ 2-5; 201:9-202:25;
219-20,\ 2; 576:1-591:4; 620:16-631:17; 638:10-642:9; 696:3-700:2; see also R. 872, at
6:18-23,11:20-22.) Instead, Allstate simply claimed that it had complied with
subsection (g).
Through interrogatories, the Casadays asked Allstate to identify its
employees who allegedly sent the notices required by subsection (g) (which, by
the time of the Casadays7 accident, had been renumbered subsection (h)) and the
date the notices were sent. {See R. 121.) Allstate should have sent the notices
with the Casadays' February 16 and August 16, 2001 renewal notices. (R. 87, f
10.) Allstate produced a copy of the notice it claimed to have sent the Casadays
on August 16,2001, but not the February 16, 2001 notice. {See R. 87-88, % 12.)
After first claiming that a second notice did not exist {see R. 103-05) and
after the discovery cut-off date had passed, Allstate produced for the first time a
second notice, which it claimed to have sent the Casadays in April 2001 {see R. 88,
113; 94-96; 99).

6

The Casadays then asked the court to extend the time for them to amend
their pleadings and complete discovery (see R. 81-111,128), and Allstate moved to
compel the plaintiffs to produce all communications between them and Allstate,
claiming that the communications "are integral to this case because tlte claims being
made by plaintiffs include their never liaving received notice oftlie new 2001 UIM law
that defendant maintains it sent them.f/ (See R. 159 (emphasis added).) That notice
was only required by subsection (g), not subsection (b).
At the hearing on the Casadays' motion to modify the case management
order, counsel for Allstate acknowledged that the case arose out of the change in
the UIM law in 2001 (R. 335, at 9:18-21), that the change required a written waiver
for new policies (R. 335, at 10:8-12), but, for renewal policies, required written
notice to the insured in the next two renewal notices (R. 335, at 11:1-9), which was
"this situation" (R. 335, at 11:10-11). Allstate claimed that the notice it sent in
April 2001 satisfied its obligation under subsection (g) to send notice with the
February 16,2001 renewal notice. Allstate told the court that that the parties
simply interpreted the statute differently. (R. 335, at 12:10-12.) Allstate admitted
that it should have produced in its initial disclosures the notices it claims to have
sent under subsection (g) but was not able to find the first notice at that time. (R.
335, at 13:12-17.)

7

Recognizing that, whether Allstate sent the two notices required by
subsection (g) was "a very relevant issue" (R. 335, at 22:16-22), the trial court let
the Casadays take two additional depositions on that issue. (R. 268.)
Allstate now claims that it was surprised when, in response to its motion
for summary judgment, the Casadays claimed that Allstate had not complied
with subsection (g). Rather, it was the Casadays who were surprised when, after
going through extensive discovery on whether Allstate had complied with
subsection (g), even after the discovery cut-off date had passed, Allstate then
tried to hide behind a single, solitary reference to subsection (b) in the plaintiffs'
complaint.
The " pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file" clearly showed that the Casadays were claiming that Allstate did not give
them the notices required by subsection (g). Because there were genuine issues
of material fact as to whether Allstate had complied with subsection (g),9 the trial
court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment.
Allstate claims that the Casadays raised the "new claim" that Allstate had
not complied with subsection (g) "for the first time" in their memorandum in

9

See Br. of the Appellants at 17 (showing that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Allstate ever sent the April 2001 notice to the
Casadays, even assuming the April notice could make up for Allstate's failure to
give the Casadays notice with their February 2001 renewal).
8

opposition to Allstate's motion for summary judgment.

This argument ignores

"the pleadings [including Allstate's own answer], depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions" set out above, as well as the opinions of the
expert witnesses on both sides. (See, e.g., R. 273-304 (reports of plaintiffs' liability
experts, who opined that Allstate had not complied with the 2001 UM/UIM law,
including subsection (g)) & R. 564:7-10 (opinion of Allstate's expert that "of
course" the claims were sufficiently developed that the case would be tried on
both the theory that the policy was a new policy, requiring compliance with
subsection (b), and that it was a renewal policy, requiring compliance with
subsection (g)).
Allstate notes that, under Utah's liberal pleading rules, a plaintiff "'must
only give the defendant "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved,"'" but adds that
"'it must do at least that much'" and claims that the Casadays did not even do
that much. 11 Allstate's own answer belies this claim. Allstate recognized that the
Casadays were seeking UIM limits equal to their liability limits and alleged that
section 31A-22-305(9)(g) "specifically applies in lieu of subsection 9(b)," and
further alleged that "Allstate fully complied with the provisions of subsection

10

u

See, e.g., Br. of Appellee at 12-13,14.
See Br. of Appellee at 13 (emphasis and citations omitted).
9

9(g)/' (R. 25, f 6.) In response to the Casadays' allegation that Allstate had
advised them, /y[i]n violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts," that their
UIM coverage was only $10,000 (see R. 4,112), Allstate admitted that it had so
advised the Casadays but claimed that its advice was true, "as established by
their coverage elections and through compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9)(g) (2001)" (R. 26,112). Allstate further alleged that "Utah Code Ann. §
31A-22-305(9)(g) (2001) directly governs the Underinsured Motorist coverage
limits of plaintiffs' automobile policy with Allstate." (R. 28,4th defense.)
Although Allstate erroneously characterized this as an affirmative defense,12 once
it did the Casadays were entitled to assert any argument available to them. 13
Asael Farr & Sons14 and the other cases Allstate relies on for its position, 15
are distinguishable. Farr arose out of an ice-cream maker's efforts to insure its
operations. Farr was working with several brokers or agents to place new
coverage before its existing policy expired but was not able to do so. The day it
submitted a new application but before the policy was issued, it suffered a loss.

12

See infra pp. 22-23.

13

E.g., City of Palmer v. Anderson, 603 P.2d 495,498 (Alaska 1979).

14

Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315,193 P.3d
650, cert denied, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah 2009).
15

Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,48 P.3d 895, and Harper v.
Evans, 2008 UT App 165,185 P.3d 573, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008).
10

It sued the agents and insurers it had been working with for, among other things,
breach of contract. The alleged contract was a commitment by one of the agents
to determine all of Farr's insurable risks, advise Farr of available coverages, and
ensure that Farr was covered for all the risks.16 The complaint did not allege that
the defendants had actually bound coverage and refused to pay. 17 In response to
the defendants' motions for summary judgment, Farr alleged, for the first time,
that one of the insurers had orally bound coverage before the loss. The court
held that Farr's breach-of-contract claim was not broad enough to cover this
claim. It reasoned that the "premise" of Farr's claims as pleaded was that Farr
was not adequately insured for the losses it suffered and that the defendants
breached some duty to Farr to ensure that it was adequately covered. 18 Farr's
new theory that insurance for the loss had been orally bound before the loss, was
"directly contrary" to its theory that it was not adequately covered for the loss.19
Since there was "nothing in the complaint to suggest that Farr intended to assert
the existence of adequate coverage as an alternative theory," 20 the court

16

See 2008 UT App 315, f 15.

17

Id. If 18.

18

Id. 117.

19

Id. If 18.

20

Id.
11

concluded that the complaint did not give the defendants adequate notice of the
oral binder theory.
Similarly, in Holmes the court held that a breach-of-contract claim against a
title insurer for breach of the insurance policy did not properly raise a claim for
breach of contractual duties arising outside of the policy. And in Harper the court
held that a medical malpractice claim arising out of allegedly negligent surgery
did not include a claim for continuing negligent treatment in follow-up care.
By contrast, in this case all the Casadays' claims were based on their theory
that their UIM limits should have been the same as their liability limits. The
Casadays' claimed they did not have adequate UIM coverage because Allstate
did not comply with the UIM statute. Their theory that Allstate did not comply
with subsection (g) was subsumed within that theory and entirely consistent with
their claims. That theory was at issue no later than when Allstate filed its answer
asserting that subsection (g), rather than subsection (b), applied. Moreover, the
theory was fully discovered during the course of discovery. In fact, whether
Allstate complied with its obligations under subsection (g) was the main issue in
discovery. Thus, this case is not like Fan, Holmes, or Harper, where the plaintiffs'

12

new theories were never raised until the plaintiffs filed their memoranda in
opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 21
Allstate argues that this court in Farr looked solely to the complaint to see
if a claim was raised and "made no attempt to determine whether discovery had
occurred on that particular claim or whether the opposing party had some other
'notice' and opportunity to defend." 22 The court in Farr did not have to look
beyond the complaint because, unlike here, Farr never argued that its alternative,

21

See Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 38, f 31 ("This claim was originally raised
in Holmes's memorandum in opposition to First American's motion to
dismiss/for summary judgment, and was not raised in the complaint."); Farr,
2008 UT App 315, % 19 ("Farr's oral binder claim was first raised, after
approximately three years of discovery, in Farr's memorandum in opposition to
Hartford's motion for summary judgment.") (footnote omitted); Harper, 2008 UT
App 165, % 14 ("we cannot rely on the allegations of a negligent course of
treatment raised for the first time in the Harpers' opposition to summary
judgment"). See also Br. of Appellee First American Title Ins. Co. at 18, Holmes
Dev., 2002 UT 38 (No. 20000745-SC) ("Significantly, Holmes did not present the trial court with an affidavit or any other proof that First American had
undertaken or breached any additional duties to Holmes."); Br. of Appellees
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. & American States Ins. Co. at 16, n.4, Farr, 2008 UT App
315 (No. 20070518-CA) ("it was not until after the discovery had been done and
motions for summary judgment were filed that Van, for tlie first time, raised the
argument.. . about an oral insurance binder") (emphasis in original); Br. of
Appellants at 12 & 14, Harper, 2008 UT App 165 (No. 20060984-CA)
(acknowledging that the plaintiffs' theory of the case was set out in the affidavit
of their expert, which was first filed as part of their memorandum in opposition
to the defendants' motion for summary judgment).
22

Br. of Appellees at 16.
13

"oral binder" theory was ever raised or at issue before the defendants filed their
motions for summary judgment.
Allstate argues that, if the court were to accept the Casadays' argument, it
could be potentially liable for higher UIM limits on a multitude of theories,
including equitable estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, reformation, or
detrimental reliance.23 Apart from the fact that fraud must be pleaded with
particularity, 24 none of those theories were raised by the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or admissions. Allstate's failure to comply with
subsection (g) was.
Allstate also argues that it would be prejudiced if the court were to set
aside the summary judgment because it would have to file an answer to an
amended complaint, re-open discovery, and conduct "extensive discovery on the
new issue." In fact, the issue of Allstate's compliance with subsection (g) has
already been extensively discovered. (See, e.g., R. 86-89, ^1f 7-17; 99; 102-05; 10809; 111; 119-22; 127; 185-86, ^ 1 2-5; 201:9-202:25; 219-20, f 2; R. 872, at 6:18-23,
11:20-22.) Allstate has not identified any additional discovery that would be
required.

Id. at 15.
U T A H R. CIV. P.

9(b).

14

Because "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file,/ did not show that Allstate was entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, the court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.

II.
THE COURT SHOULD GIVE EFFECT TO RULE 4(c) AND REACH
THE MERITS OF THE CAS AD AYS' POST-JUDGMENT MOTION.
The parties have previously briefed Allstate's argument that this court
lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of the Casadays' postjudgment motion to alter or amend the judgment, to amend the pleadings to
conform to the evidence, or to grant plaintiffs leave to amend.25 The Casadays
will not repeat their arguments on that issue here, other than to note that they
argued previously that the court should resolve the conflict between Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) and 4(c) by construing rule 4(b)(2) to apply to a
notice of appeal that is filed while a post-judgment motion is pending. Allstate
claims that this argument is illogical and "begs the questions as to why any party
would ever file a notice of appeal of a post-judgment motion before a trial court

See Mot. for Summ. Disposition; Mem. of P&A in Supp. of Mot. for
Summ. Disposition; Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. Disposition (incorporated
herein by reference); & Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Disposition.
15

even rules on the motion/726 The notice of appeal in that situation would not be
of the post-judgment motion but of the underlying judgment, which an appellant
may file out of an abundance of caution (for example, because he is not sure that
his post-judgment motion will be deemed a proper motion extending the time to
appeal). Rule 4(b)(2) requires a new notice of appeal from the denial of the postjudgment motion in that situation.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CASADAYS' MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT.
Allstate argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the Casadays' rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment because the
Casadays raised a "new" argument in that motion, namely, that they mistakenly
alleged the wrong statute in their complaint. As shown in point I, supra, the
Casadays did not raise a "new" argument. The argument that Allstate failed to
comply with subsection (g) has been part of this case at least since Allstate
answered the Casadays7 complaint. Rather, the Casadays merely pointed out the
law that a citation to the wrong statutory provision does not make a complaint
defective; as long as a complaint puts the defendant on notice of a valid claim so

Br. of Appellant at 24.
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that the defendant is not prejudiced by the erroneous citation and it is apparent
from the complaint that the claim would be actionable under the correct statute,
the complaint raises a good claim. (See R. 731-32 & cases cited therein.)
Allstate claims that two of the cases the Casadays cited—Huss v. Green
Spring Health Sew., Inc.,27 and Roman v. City ofMiddletown Board of Education28—
support its position that it did not have adequate notice of the Casadays' claim.
It quotes the following language from Huss: "[a] reference to the wrong statute
. . . will be corrected by the court if it can determine the appropriate statute . ..
from the complaint/' 29 and argues that the trial court could not have determined
from the Casadays' complaint that they intended subsection (g) as another basis
for recovery. Huss, however, involved a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), under which the court '"looks only to the facts alleged
in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the
record.'" 30 This case involves a motion for summary judgment, under rule 56,
which requires the court to consider all the pleadings, as well as the depositions,

27

18 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Del. 1998).

28

No. CV065000318S, 2007 WL 866480 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7,2007).

29

Br. of Appellee at 29 (quoting Hussf 18 F. Supp. 2d at 403, which in
turn was quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1210, at
30

121).

See 18 R Supp. 2d at 401-02 (citations omitted).
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answers to interrogatories, and admissions. From those materials, it was clear
that the Casadays were seeking relief under subsections (b) and (g), depending
on whether their policy was ultimately determined to be a new or existing policy.
Allstate also tries to distinguish Roman on the grounds that the complaint
in that case pleaded facts that stated a cause of action under the correct statute,
whereas, it claims, the Casadays' complaint does not. The Casadays 7 complaint,
however, alleges that their auto policy provided liability coverage of $100,000 per
person, that they never elected less UIM coverage, that they should have been
entitled to UIM coverage in a minimum amount of $100,000 per person, that, in
violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, Allstate advised them that their
policy only provided UIM coverage of $10,000 per person, and that Allstate has
refused to pay them the limits of UIM coverage required by the policy and by
law. (R. 2-5, f Tf 5, 8,10,12,15-16.) These facts state a claim under subsection
( g ). 3 1

Allstate claims that the trial court granted its motion for summary
judgment not because the Casadays' complaint referred to the wrong statute

31

Cf. Lopez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 UT App 389, tlf 11-21, — R3d
— (allegations that an insurer did not comply with subsection (b) entitled the
plaintiff to judgment on her contract claim, even though she was not a party to
the contract).
18

(subsection (b)) but because it did not cite the right statute (subsection (g)).

But

the Casadays were not required to cite to any statute in their complaint.33 If the
allegations of paragraphs 4 (that the policy was issued after January 1, 2001) and
6 (referring to subsection (b)) were omitted, their complaint would have been
sufficient to state a claim under subsection (g). In any event, Allstate was on
notice from the beginning—even before the Casadays 7 filed their complaint—that
it had to comply with subsection (g) and could be liable if it did not. (See R.
578:3-20; 583:3-9; 335, at 14:19-25.) In fact, it granted relief to others in the
Casadays' position even though they did not file suit. (See R. 698:6-700:2; 628A:5629:13.)

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONFORMED THE PLEADINGS
TO THE EVIDENCE.
Allstate argues that rule 15(b), which requires that issues "not raised by the
pleading [that] are tried by express or implied consent of the parties . . . be
32

See Br. of Appellee at 30-31.

33

See, e.g., Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152,1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Notice
pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for relief, not
causes of action, statutes or legal theories.") (citations omitted); Erickson v.
Hunter, 932 F. Supp. 1380,1384 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to cite statutory authority in the complaint).

19

treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings/' does not apply
to summary judgment proceedings. It acknowledges that there is no controlling
Utah law on point but claims that Eldridge v. FamsworthM and the cases it cites
support its position. But Eldridge did not reach the issue, and most of the Utah
cases it cited were appeals after a trial, so the issue never arose. 35 In the only
other Utah case cited, the court relied on rule 15(b) to affirm a summary
judgment on a claim that was not included in the complaint, noting that the
record supported the claim.36 Thus, if anything, Utah law supports the
application of rule 15(b) to summary judgments.
Allstate also claims the Casadays' rule 15(b) motion was untimely. But
rule 15(b) expressly says that a motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence
"may be made . . . at any time, even after judgment/ 7 That was the case here.
Atcitty v. Board of Education?7 the case Allstate relies on for its untimeliness
argument, involved a motion to amend under rule 15(a), not rule 15(b).38

34

2007 UT App 243,166 P.3d 639, cert denied, 186 P.3d 347 (Utah 2007).

35

See Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243, f 35; Keller v. Southwood N. Med.
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102,103-05 (Utah 1998); England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340,
341-42 (Utah 1997); Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409,411-12 (Utah 1998).
36

Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111, 378 P.2d 355,357-58 (1963).

37

Atcitty v. Board ofEduc. of San Juan County Sch. Dist., 967 P.2d 1261
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
38

See zd. at 1264.
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Allstate argues that the trial court did not err in denying the Casadays
leave to amend because the trial court could not grant relief under rule 15
without first granting relief under rule 59(e).39 Even assuming this rule applies to
motions to amend under rule 15(b), which expressly authorizes motions to be
filed after judgment, and not just to rule 15(a),40 the Casadays brought their
motions to amend as part of their rule 59(e) motion and asked for relief under
both rules. (See R. 765-66.)
Finally, Allstate claims that it never expressly or impliedly consented to try
the issue of its compliance with subsection (g). Allstate bases this argument on
its theory that the Casadays first raised the issue in response to Allstate's motion
for summary judgment, and that Allstate therefore objected to it at the first
opportunity because it objected to the plaintiffs theory in its reply
memorandum. In fact, the record shows that Allstate raised the issue in its
answer and in its requests for admissions; it produced documents related to the
issue; and it allowed its employees and expert to testify at length on the issue—all
without objection and all before Allstate ever filed its motion for summary

Br. of Appellee at 34-35 (citing National Advertising Co. v. Murray City
Corp., 2006 UT App 75, % 13,131 R3d 872, cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006)).
40

Cf.6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

§ 1489 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the no-amendment-after-judgment
rule in connection with rule 15(a)).
PROCEDURE
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judgment. 41 Eldridge, the case Allstate relies on, is distinguishable because in that
case, the defendant "clearly objected to the . .. introduction of new claims
whenever they arose/' 42 Allstate never objected when the issue came u p
repeatedly throughout the pretrial proceedings. The bulk of discovery was
directed to Allstate's alleged compliance with subsection (g), and Allstate never
objected that it was beyond the scope of the Casadays' claims.
Allstate seeks to excuse its implicit consent to try the subsection (g) issue
by saying that, because it raised subsection (g) as an affirmative defense, it could
not object to the Casadays conducting discovery on that issue. But Allstate s
claim that the Casadays' claim for additional UIM benefits was governed by
subsection (g) rather than subsection (b) was not an affirmative defense. An
affirmative defense is a "defendant's assertion of facts and arguments that, if
true, will defeat the plaintiffs .. . claim, even if all tlie allegations in tlte complaint are
true.//43 If, as Allstate claims, the complaint alleges that the Casadays' policy was
a new policy subject to subsection (b), Allstate's claim that the policy was an
existing policy subject to subsection (g) would not defeat the Casadays' claim if
41

See supra pt. I.

42

Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243, % 38.

43

482 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). See
also Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, % 31, 56 P.3d 524 (an affirmative
defense "is a defense employed to defeat the plaintiff's claim by raising matters
outside or extrinsic to the plaintiff's prima facie case") (citations omitted).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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their allegations were true. Because Allstate's claim "directly assail[ed] or
'merely controverted] [the] plaintiffs prima facie case/" it was not an
affirmative defense but simply a denial of the Casadays' allegations.44 Allstate
could have opposed the Casadays' discovery regarding subsection (g) and
simply chose not to. Therefore, it at least implicitly consented to try the issue.

V.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE
CASADAYS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.
The Casadays have previously addressed Allstate's arguments regarding
the timeliness of, justification for, and prejudice of an amendment. 45 Allstate's
claim of prejudice fails because even if the amendment "'would advance a new
theory of recovery/" where that theory is "'based almost entirely on facts already
in evidence, the court should liberally allow amendment because the opposing
party is then generally prepared to address such a claim/" 46
Allstate argues that, even if this court allows amendment of the judgment
under rule 59(e), it would have to remand the case to the trial court to determine
44

See Prince, 2002 UT 68, % 31.

45

See Br. of Appellants at 44-48.

46

Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, \ 34, 87 R3d 734
(quoting Aurora Credit Sews. v. liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,1282 (Utah
1998)).
23

whether amendment under rule 15(a) or 15(b) is appropriate. If this court finds,
however, that amendment is appropriate, it can reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with the Casadays' proposed amended complaint,
particularly where, as here, the parties have briefed on appeal the propriety of
amendment. 47
Finally, Allstate accuses the Casadays of "starting] with the conclusionbad faith—then work[ing] backwards to find theories or facts to support it" 4 8 The
Casadays started with the fact that Allstate told them they only had $10,000 in
UIM coverage, despite their liability limits of $100,000. They asked Allstate to
show them that it had complied with the provisions of Utah's UIM statute.
Allstate could not do so because it neither obtained a written acknowledgment
under subsection (b) nor did it send notices with the Casadays 7 first two renewals
under subsection (g). Allstate tries to avoid the conclusion of bad faith by hiding
behind a hypertechnical reading of the complaint and its own failure to produce
a critical document until after the time for amending the pleadings had passed.
The court should not countenance these efforts.

47

See id. f 48. See also, e.g., Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners
Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC.f — P.3d — , \ \ 77-78, 2009 UT 65;
Hancock v. True & Living Church of Jesus Christ oftlte Last Days, 2005 UT App 314, f
20,118 P.3d 297; Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, % 37, 53 P.3d 2, cert, denied, 59
P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).
48

See Br. of Appellee at 41.
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CONCLUSION
The court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this
case so that it can be decided on its merits.
DATED this day of 28th day of December, 2009.
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
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